TRUSTS: INFLATIONARY CHANGE IN ECONOMIC CONDITIONS HELD NOT TO WARRANT DEVIATION FROM
RESTRICTIVE INVESTMENT PROVISIONS OF CHARITABLE TRUST
THE Duke Endowment, a charitable trust for the benefit of institutions of higher education, hospitals, orphanages, retired preachers,

widows, and orphans, was established in 1924 with a corpus of forty
million dollars. Today, the corpus is valued at over four hundred
and seventy million dollars. Due to the restrictive investment provisions of the trust indenture,' over eighty percent of the Endowment's assets are presently limited to Duke Power Company common and preferred stock.2 In Cocke v. Duke Univ., 3 the trustees
brought suit to obtain discretionary investment powers to diversify
the trust assets. 4 They argued that diversification was needed since
Duke Power was now a mature corporation which lacked the growth
potential necessary to maintain the economic value of the trust
assets and the purchasing power of the income relative to an inflationary economy. The Supreme Court of North Carolina, however,

found no actual or foreseeable inflationary loss, and applying New
1The
investment provisions of the indenture restricted investment by the trustees
to securities of "Duke Power Company, or of a subsidiary thereof, or in bonds validly
issued by the United States of America, or by a State thereof, or by a district, county,
town or city which has a population in excess of fifty thousand people according to
the then last Federal census, which is located in the United States of America, which
has not since 1900 defaulted in the payment of any principal or interest upon or with
respect to any of its obligations, and the bonded indebtedness of which does not
exceed ten percent of its assessed values." The indenture further required a unanimous affirmation of the trustees to sell Duke Power securities. TnE Dux ENDOWMENT
-INDENTURE
OF JAiMss B. DUKE § 3, pp. 8-9.
2 The remainder of the Endowment's assets is invested as follows: 12.21% in common and preferred stock of Aluminum Company of America and Aluminum, Limited;
.65% in other stocks; 3.25% in bonds of Duke Power Company; 3.68% in bills or
notes of the United States. Brief for Appellee, p. 7.
3260 N.C. 1, 131 S.E.2d 909 (1963).
'Specifically the trustees asked the court to add the following clause to the original
investment provisions, which would allow investments "in such other securities, including common and preferred stocks, bonds and debentures of private corporations,
and other property, real or personal, as said trustees shall, in their discretion, deem
advisable, without being restricted to such investments or reinvestments as are permissible for executors and trustees under any present or future applicable law, rule oi
court or court decision." Brief for Appellee, p. 20.
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Jersey law,5 held that it is necessary to show more than mere change
in economic conditions before deviation will be permitted.0
I The power of equity courts to authorize deviation from the administrative terms7 of a trust is derived from their inherent jurisdiction over the administration of trusts. 8 Under certain circumstances
equity can authorize an act which is specifically forbidden if essential to preserve the trust and not merely advantageous to the beneficiaries. 10 Courts generally justify such deviation either on the
theory that they are doing what the settlor would have done had he
foreseen the present circumstances or on the ground that they are
carrying out the dominant purpose of the settlor."1 Deviation is
"This indenture... is intended to be made, administered and given effect under
and in accordance with the present existing laws and statutes of [New Jersey] .... notwithstanding it may be administered and the beneficiaries hereof may be located in
whole or in part in other states, and the validity and construction thereof shall be
determined and governed in all respects by such laws and statutes." Tns DUKE ENDOWMIENT-INDENTURE OF JArEs B. DUKE § 8, p. 27. (Emphasis added.)
"Present existing laws and statutes" was held by the court to mean those laws and
statutes applicable at the time the trust was formed. A New Jersey Superior Court
has held that a provision substantially identical to this one was limited in application
to the general administration of the estate and did not apply to a provision relating
specifically to investment or reinvestment. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Price, 18 N.J.
Super. 578, 87 A.2d 565 (Ch. 1952). As to provisions relative to investment and reinvestment the law effective at the time of the litigation governs. 260 N.C. at 17, 131
S.E.2d at 919.
07 Cocke v. Duke Univ., 260 N.C. 1, 20, 181 S.E.2d 909, 921 (1963).
Every trust indenture contains two parts: administrative terms, which provide the
methods the trustee is to use in the management of the trust property (such as
provisions for new investments), and dispositive terms, which usually provide who is
to get the benefit of the trust income and often state the settlor's purpose in creating
the trust. BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 561, at 128-29 (2d ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited

as

BOGERT].

8 See BOGERT § 561, at 134-35; ScoT, TRUSTS § 167, at 1168 (2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter
cited as ScoTT]; Scott, Deviation from the Terms of a Trust, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1025,

1034-35 (1931). Some states have confirmed the inherent equity jurisdiction by statute.
See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 498:4 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:15-15 (1953).
' See, e.g., Foust v. William E. English Foundation, 118 Ind. App. 484, 80 N.E.2d

303 (1948) (authorized forbidden sale of property); Long v. Simmons Female College,
218 Mass. 135, 105 N.E. 553 (1914) (allowed trustee to mortgage property); American
Academy of Arts & Sciences v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 78 Mass. (12
Gray) 582 (1832) (investment of corpus in other than specified goods); BOGERT § 562;
ScoTT §§ 167, 381.

"oWhere strict adherence to the administrative terms of a trust will accomplish the
trust's purpose, deviation will not be authorized merely to benefit beneficiaries or
corpus. See Stanton v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 150 Cal. App. 2d 763, 310
P.2d 1010 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Rogers v. English, 130 Conn. 332, 33 A.2d 540 (1943);
Johns v. Johns, 172 Ill. 472, 50 N.E. 337 (1898); Hackett's Ex'rs v. Hackett's Devisees,

180 Ky. 406, 202 S.W. 864 (1918);

BOGERT

§ 561, at 136 n. 26.

11 See St. Louis Trust Co. v. Ghio, 240 Mo. App. 1033, 222 S.W.2d 556 (1949); Trust
Co. v. Greenwood Cemetery, 21 N.J. Misc. 169, 32 A.2d 519 (Ch. 1943); Scor § 167, at
1176-77; Scott, supra note 8, at 1027.
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usually permitted where compliance is impossible 1 2 or illegal,13 or
where there has been an unforeseen change of circumstances which
would defeat or impair the dominant purpose of the trust.' 4
Courts applying the unforeseen change of circumstances rule to
private trusts, as distinguished from charitable trusts, usually require that there be an emergency or necessity which' seriously
threatens the trust.15 This strict application of the rule is attributable to the fact that courts have difficulty in ascertaining the purpose
of the settlor beyond the generalization that it is to preserve corpus or
provide income. 16 On the other hand, courts have shown a tendency
to be more liberal in applying this rule to charitable trusts.' 7 In a
Moreover,
charitable trust the purpose is usually clearly stated.'
there is a more apparent need for flexible investment powers in
charitable trusts which lack competing interests between temporary
income beneficiaries and remaindermen" and have a perpetual
12 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §§ 165, 381, comment b (1959); ScoTT § 165. See,
e.g., Simon v. Reilly, 126 N.J. Eq. 546, 10 A.2d 474 (Ch. 1940) (trustee directed to invest
in guaranteed mortgages but no guaranty company in state); In re Thomson's Will,
43 N.Y.S.2d 392 (Surr. Ct. 1943) (trustee directed to buy specific bonds which were
subsequently called for payment).
See,
13 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRusrs §§ 166, 381, comment c (1959); ScoTT § 166.
e.g., Stout v. Stout, 192 Ky. 504, 233 S.W. 1057 (1921); Joe Gouy Shong v. Joe Chew
Shee, 254 Mass. 366, 150 N.E. 225 (1926).
1' BOGERT § 561, at 131; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §§ 167, 381, comment d
(1959); ScoTT § 167.
IuSee Stanton v. Wells Fargo Bank 9=Union Trust Co., 150 Cal. App. 2d 763, 310
P.2d 1010 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Thompson v. Union Nat'l Bank, 291 S.W.2d 178 (Mo.
1956); Lambertville Nat'l Bank v. Bumster, 141 N.J. Eq. 396, 57 A.2d 525 (Ch. 1948);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 167, comment c (1959).

10 See cases cited note 15 supra.

17See Estate of Loring, 29 Cal.2d 423, 175 P.2d 524, modifying, 168 P.2d 224 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1946); First Nat'l Bank v. Stevens, 9 N.J. Super. 324, 74 A.2d 368 (Ch. 1950);
4 PowELL, REAL PROPERTY 579, at 488 (1954); ScoTT § 381, at 2741.
In several recent decisions the English courts have recognized a distinction between
charitable and private trusts in applying the deviation doctrine. See, e.g., In re
Shipwrecked Fishermen & Mariners' Royal Benevolent Soc'y, [1959] 1 Ch. 220; In re
Royal Soc'y's Charitable Trusts, [19 56 ] 1 Ch. 87.
Several state legislatures have enacted statutes giving charitable trustees wider
investment powers than ordinary trustees. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 2851-306
(1958); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4216 (1) (1961); Wis. STAT. § 36.065 (1961).
The courts' tendency to be more liberal in the case of charitable trusts is illustrated
by the historical development of the cy pres doctrine. In applying this doctrine to
charitable trusts the courts allow deviation in the purposes of the trust as well as its
administrative terms. See ScoTT § 381, at 2741-42.
"8See, e.g., John A. Creighton Home v. Waltman, 140 Neb. 3, 299 N.W. 261 (1941).
10 In a private trust the temporary beneficiaries are interested in getting as much
income as possible while the remaindermen are mainly interested in the preservation
of the corpus. Thus the income beneficiaries are more willing to allow the trustees
to speculate in corporate stock. See First Nat'l Bank v. Stevens, 9 N.J. Super. 324,
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existence.
The inflationary economy of the past two decades and the resulting devaluation of the dollar is an additional factor in favor of
a more liberal application of the deviation doctrine. Most charitable trusts with restrictive investment provisions were established at
a time when securities yielding a fixed rate of interest and having
a set redemption value were thought to be safe trust investments
since they produced a steady income and did not fluctuate in value. 21
The demands made upon the earning power of a trust in an extended
period of inflation, however, require that the corpus include a
relatively large segment of growth assets.2 2 As a result of this change
in trust investment needs, investment provisions which were originally economically sound no longer fully exploit investment poten23

tial.

74 A.2d 368, 369 (Ch. 1950); Middleton Estate, I Pa. D. 8&C.2d 162 (Orphans' Ct.
1954); 109 U. PA. L. REv. 908, 910 (1961). Compare John A. Creighton Home v.
Waltman, 140 Neb. 3, 299 NAV. 261 (1941) and Morris Community Chest v. Wilentz,
124 N.J. Eq. 580, 8 A.2d 808 (Ch. 1939), with Reiner v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 127
N.J. Eq. 377, 13 A.2d 291 (1940), reversing 126 NJ. Eq. 78, 8 A.2d 175 (Ch. 1939) and
Bliss v. Bliss, 126 N.J. Eq. 808, 8 A.2d 705 (Ch. 1939), aff'd, 127 N.J. Eq. 20, 11 A.2d
13 (1940).
" "The typical charitable trust is intended to last a very long time. Thus more
extensive and more flexible powers in the trustees arc reasonable and needed." 4
Powxxs, REAL PROPERTY 579, at 488 (1954). See Maxcy v. City of Oshkosh, 144 Wis.
238, 128 N.W. 899 (1910); ScoTr § 381, at 2741.
21The Nebraska Supreme Court, allowing deviation from the restrictive investment
provisions of a charitable trust, stated that: "The requirement as to the investment of
the funds was one which, at the time the will was made, had been demonstrated to be
safe by economic standards and practices then in force. It had received, not only
sanction as a safe business practice, but the approval of legislative bodies and courts.
It is likewise obvious that the economic situation now existing is one which could not
reasonably have been foreseen by Mr. Creighton at the time the trust was created."
John A. Creighton Home v. Waltman, 140 Neb. 3, 8, 299 N.W. 261, 265 (1941).
See, e.g., Morris Community Chest v. Wilentz, 124 N.J. Eq. 580, 8 A.2d 808 (Ch. 1939)
(charitable trust created in 1931); In re Kirby Memorial Health Center, 36 Luz. Leg.
Reg. 70 (Luzerne County Ct., Pa. 1941) (deviation allowed in non-growth charitable
trust created in 1928). Since the recent inflationary trend in the economy there has
been a great increase in discretionary trusts. Stevenson, Why the Prudent Man?, 7
VAND. L. REv. 74 passim (1958).
22 See Buek, "Qualified" Trustee Performance Calls for Full Investment Freedom, 99
TRUSTS .& EsTATE.s 864 (1957); Fingar, Changing Concepts of Trust Investments, 96
TRusTs & EsrATEs 864 (1957); Flacker, Managing Fiduciary Funds, 89 Tausrs & EsTATEs
32 (1950); Scully, Changing Concepts of Trust Investments, 97 TRUSTS & ESTATEs 912
(1958); Shattuck, The Trustee's Duty to Invest, 86 TRusTs & ESTATEs 119 (1948);
Comment, Trusts-Trustees-InvestmentDuties of Trustees and the Problem of Unduly.
Conservative Trust Investments, 61 Mien. L. REv. 1545 (1963).
2' See cases cited note 21 supra. Courts have generally authorized deviation where
a non-growth charitable trust has suffered an actual inflationary loss in economic
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In private trust cases, courts generally have held that an inflationary reduction in income and corpus is not such an emergency
as to require deviation.24 However, one recent case, involving a
non-growth private trust created prior to the inflationary change in
the economy, authorized investment in growth assets where the trust
had sustained an actual economic loss. 25 If inflation resulting in
detriment is a valid reason for allowing deviation in private trusts,
it is even more significant in cases involving charitable trusts because
26
of their perpetual nature and importance to society.
A New Jersey Chancery Court case, Morris Community Chest v.
Wilentz, 27 illustrates the protracted effect inflation has on nongrowth charitable trusts. 28

In Wilentz, inflation had substantially

reduced both the purchasing power of the income and the economic
value of the corpus. Taking judicial notice of the change in economic conditions since the creation of the trust, the court permitted
the trustees to invest in corporate stock, 29 thus giving the trust
growth potential necessary to effectuate more efficiently the trust's
purpose of providing income for charity. Wilentz also illustrates
that in permitting deviation from the administrative terms of
charitable trusts, courts talk in terms of dominant intent and purpose, while in fact their concern is in protecting the economic value
of charitable trusts against major changes in economic conditions.8 0
value. John A. Creighton Home v. Waltman, 140 Neb. 3, 299 N.W. 261 (1941).
Contra, Toledo Trust Co. v. Toledo Hosp., 174 Ohio St. 124, 187 N.E.2d 36 (1962).
2"See, e.g., Stanton v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 150 Cal. App. 2d 763,
310 P.2d 1010 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Bliss v. Bliss, 126 N.J. Eq. 308, 8 A.2d 705 (Ch.
1939), aff'd, 127 N.J. Eq. 20, 11 A.2d 13 (1940).
2 In re Trusteeship Under Agreement With Mayo, 259 Minn. 91, 105 N.W.2d 900
(1960), 109 U. PA. L. REv. 908 (1961). See also Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Morgan, 94 N.H.
284, 51 A.2d 841 (1947).
20 The effect inflation can have on a charitable trust the trustees of which lack
flexible investment powers is illustrated by the present plight of the Girard Estate
which was established to maintain a school for orphan boys. The Girard Estate is a
"legal" trust (limited to non-growth securities) under the laws of Pennsylvania. "As
a result, the postwar period of inflation played havoc with the once impregnable
financial position of the Girard Estate. In 1940 the net income of $1,889,000 supported
1,733 boys and maintained the plant in excellent style and yet in 1959 the net income
of $235,000 was sufficient to care for 800 boys only, and this after severe economies
and a drawing upon reserves." Tashjian, Future of Charitable Trusts, 99 TRUSTS &=
EsTATES 1090, 1092-93 (1960).
27124 N.J. Eq. 580, 3 A.2d 808 (Ch. 1939).
28The endowment was limited to "legal" investments as specified in N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 3A:15-1 (1953). 124 N.J. Eq. at 582, 3 A.2d at 809.
"Investment experts generally agree that corporate stocks are the best hedge
against inflation, although not a perfect one. Flacker, supra note 22.
o In Wilentz, the court apparently felt that since the settlor had not specified the

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1964:183

Although courts have allowed deviation only in cases where an
inflationary economy has already had an obvious adverse effect on
a charitable trust,3 1 several state legislatures have enacted statutes
which appear to empower courts to authorize deviation when it is
merely foreseeable that future detriment will result if the original
investment provisions are not changed. 32 The New Jersey statute83
allows a court to permit deviation if it is shown that by reason of a
change in conditions "which may be reasonably foreseen" the objects
and purposes of the trust "might be defeated in whole or in part."
This liberal statute, however, is inapplicable to a charitable trust
such as Cocke which has not suffered any actual inflationary loss
and has grown tremendously in dollar value over the past forty years.
Thus, the North Carolina court in refusing to permit deviation was
34
within the confines of existing law.
If, however, the Endowment were to suffer an inflationary loss
or if the trustees were able to prove that such was foreseeable, the
instant decision would not seem to foreclose a subsequent action. 3
In that event, the court could logically allow deviation. Wilentz, the
only reported New Jersey decision with a fact situation similar to
amount of income the charity was to receive, he therefore meant the maximum

amount in a given economy.
31See generally Annot., 170 A.L.R. 1219 (1947).
32 However, when a state has a statute which so limits trust investments as to

prohibit the purchase of corporate stock unless authorized by the terms of the trust,
the court cannot properly authorize deviation. On the other hand, several states
which have legal lists have statutes that provide such lists shall not limit the power

of a court of competent jurisdiction to permit a fiduciary to deviate from the terms
of the trust as to investments.

Scorr § 167, at 1170 n.14.

E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN.

§ 3A:15-1 (v) (1953).
OsThis statute applies to both private and charitable trusts. It specifically
authorizes a court of competent jurisdiction to allow investment of the whole or some
part of a trust in any class of investments, including common and preferred stocks.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:15-15 (1953).
8, This case raises important questions which the court did not have to answer.
That is, what factors should be considered in determining whether a public utility
such as Duke Power Company lacks the growth potential necessary to maintain the
value of the trust in the face of an inflationary economy? If such a test were adopted,
what would be necessary to show a reasonably foreseeable loss?
The court in reaching this decision apparently did not consider the relationship of
the Endowment, Duke Power Company, and the settIor. From the indenture it
appears that the settlor planned a close mutually beneficial relationship between Duke
Power and the Duke Endowment. If in a later action this relationship is construed
to be a dominant purpose of the settlor, it could be a strong factor in favor of refusing
deviation even though the trust might face a reasonably foreseeable loss.
8r Any substantial change in circumstances in the Duke Endowment, such as actual
loss in economic value of the corpus, would seem to make this decision inoperative as
to res judicata. See Lasasso v. Lasasso, I N.J. 324, 63 A.2d 526 (1949); Flynt v. Flynt,
237 N.C. 754, 75 S.E.2d 901 (1953).
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Cocke, recognized the distinction between private and charitable
trusts and authorized deviation where a charitable trust had suffered
an actual inflationary loss of income and corpus. 36

Moreover,

despite the narrow construction given the New Jersey statute in two
private trust cases, 37 its terms are broad enough to allow deviation
from the terms of a charitable trust such as the Duke Endowment,
if an inflationary loss were foreseeable.
There are strong policy, factors which would call for such a holding. A charitable trust has a perpetual existence and therefore needs
more flexible investment provisions in order to meet changing conditions. Since the underlying purpose of a charitable trust is to
benefit the public38 and considering the fact that any inflationary
loss by the Duke Endowment would be largely borne by the people
and institutions of North Carolina, the North Carolina court should
have a special incentive to allow deviation.

10The authority of Wilentz as to modification of investment provisions of charitable
trusts has never been questioned. See Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Morgan, 94 N.H. 284, 51
A.2d 841 (1947); First Nat'1 Bank v. Stevens, 9 N.J. Super. 324, 74 A.2d 368 (Ch. 1950)
(recognized that Wilentz applied to charitable trusts and not to private trusts); ScoTr
§ 167, n.14.
The supreme court record of the instant case includes the complaint and final
decree of the following unreported New Jersey cases with fact situations and holdings
similar to Wilentz: Blair Academy v. Trustees of the Presbytery, No. 121/238, Ch. N.J.
(1938); Smith v. Hardin, No. 121/83, Oh. N.J. (1938); Askew v. Fidelity Union Trust
Co., No. 119/190, Ch.N.J. (1937). Record, pp. 297-347, 359-92, Cocke v. Duke Univ.,
260 N.C. 1, 131 S.E.2d 909 (1963).
"7Bliss v. Bliss, 126 N.J. Eq. 308, 8 A.2d 705 (Oh. 1939), aff'd, 127 N.J. Eq. 20, 11
A.2d 13 (1940); Reiner v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 126 N.J. Eq. 78, 8 A.2d 175 (Oh.
1939), rev'd, 127 N.J. Eq. 377, 13 A.2d 291 (1940). In Bliss, where a private trust had
suffered inflationary loss of income and corpus, deviation was not allowed. The court
felt that the investment provisions were broad enough and was afraid that harm might
result to the remaindermen if the trustees were given discretionary investment powers.
In Reiner, having a fact situation similar to Bliss, the court of errors and appeals
relied on Bliss in reversing a chancery court decision which had allowed deviation.
In Cocke the North Carolina Supreme Court relied on these cases as representing New
Jersey law.
11"The essential idea of a charitable trust is that its benefit is to be for the whole
public, or some large class of the public as distinguished from private persons."
Johnson v. Bowen, 85 NJ. Eq. 76, 95 A. 370, 372 (Ch. 1915).

